Politics, Groups, and Identities

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Published online: 17 Jun 2014.

To cite this article: Natasha Behl (2014): Situated citizenship: understanding Sikh citizenship through women's exclusion, Politics, Groups, and Identities, DOI: 10.1080/21565503.2014.927775

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2014.927775

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Situated citizenship: understanding Sikh citizenship through women’s exclusion

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(Received 11 November 2013; accepted 27 April 2014)

Democratization scholars point to institutional indicators to argue that Indian democracy is consolidated and Indian women are full citizens. I point to another set of data to demonstrate that Indian democracy is at risk because of the gendered nature of citizenship. I argue that institutional indicators tell a very limited story, because they often render women and gender invisible. I analyze situated citizenship through semi-structured, in-depth interview data. I find that respondents naturalize gendered citizenship, which results in a demarcation of home and marriage as the natural space of Sikh women. I find a situation of exclusionary inclusion, where women are an essential part of formal institutional democracy, but are unable to acquire full, substantive citizenship because they are understood as restricted to home and marriage. These results suggest that Indian democracy is weaker than democratization literature would suggest because women experience democracy differentially; women do not have the actual power to be active as citizens, to enjoy a bundle of rights, and to command democratic participation.

Keywords: gender; democracy; citizenship; exclusion; India; Sikhs

Introduction

Institutional indicators show that Indian democracy is a model of democratic transition and consolidation — India has adopted and maintained universal adult franchise, has had mostly free and fair elections, has viable political parties across the ideological spectrum, a vibrant press, a professional military, and an independent judiciary. When it comes to gender, institutional indicators again show that India is a model of democratic transition and consolidation — India has had a female prime minister, a female president, multiple female leaders of prominent political parties, many strong female state leaders, a reservation system guaranteeing women 33% of village council seats, a growing female representation in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), and a growing female voter turnout.

Data on violence against women reveal a different picture. A 2012 household survey by UN Women found that 95% of women and girls feel unsafe in public spaces in the capital city, Delhi. The survey also found that 51% of men self-reported perpetrating violence against women and girls in public spaces. An analysis of nationwide data on crimes against women reveal that on average, every hour in India two women are raped, four are kidnapped, one dies in a dowry-related dispute, four are molested, one is sexually harassed, and 11 experience an act of cruelty

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by their husband (Indian National Crime Records Bureau). One instance of such violence occurred on 16 December 2012, when a 23-year-old female physiotherapy student and her 28-year-old male companion were attacked on a public bus in Delhi. Six men gang-raped the woman. The attackers drove the bus for two hours passing through three police checkpoints taking turns raping the young woman. Both were dumped naked and bleeding on the side of the road. The woman died a few weeks later from massive internal injuries. Indian women’s lack of safety, both experienced and perceived, undermines their ability to access public spaces.

To understand how these two can coexist – women’s integration into formal institutional democracy and their exclusion from public space – I point to another set of data based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with members of the Sikh community. I turn to this data because an analysis of citizenship requires specificity. How are dimensions such as religion, ethnicity, caste, and gender implicated in structuring the material circumstances of women’s lives and their experience of citizenship? These questions matter because these categories are central to construction and transformation of gendered citizenship. The account I give of Sikh situated citizenship is not intended to be generalizable or universal. I argue for a contextual approach to citizenship because this approach makes visible the situated intersections between gender and other identity categories. Though I point out that my account of Sikh citizenship is not generalizable, I argue that this account illustrates the gap between the abstract promise of equal citizenship and the lived experience of situated citizenship in India.

Through an analysis of interview data, I demonstrate how respondents naturalize gendered citizenship, which results in a demarcation of certain domains, in particular home and marriage, as the natural space of Sikh women beyond the reach of social, economic, and political intervention. I argue that institutional indicators tell a very limited story – and hide more than they show because these formal institutions often render women and gender invisible. I draw on critical scholarship on citizenship to develop an understanding of citizenship as legal status and situated social relation. I analyze women’s situated citizenship because it expands our focus beyond institutional indicators, which makes visible the gendering of Sikh citizenship. I find a situation of exclusionary inclusion, where inclusion exists alongside discriminatory practices. Sikh women are an essential part of formal institutional democracy, but are unable to acquire full, substantive citizenship because women are understood as restricted to home and marriage. These findings suggest, contrary to the democratization literature, that Indian democracy is not yet a model democracy because women experience democracy differentially; women do not have the actual power to be active as citizens.

This analysis of Sikh women in India is significant because it suggests that the complex processes of democratic participation and inclusion cannot be solely measured through institutional indicators. These indicators overlook the gendering of Sikh citizenship, which has widespread implications for citizenship rights, democratic policy-making, and a democratic state. It is easy enough to think that gendered citizenship harms only women. But this conclusion overlooks the broader implications of women’s exclusion. Women’s inability to acquire full, effective citizenship through participation in civil society impacts all citizens. Women’s participation in civil society is key for improving democratic policy responsiveness, especially to progressive social policies. Also, women’s participation is crucial because only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state.

This analysis of Sikh citizenship also responds to an important gap in the citizenship literature. According to Lister, there is an imbalance between theoretical and empirical work on citizenship (2007, 58). Lister calls for more empirical studies on the “cultural, social, and political practices that constitute lived citizenship for different groups … in different … contexts” (2007, 58). This article responds to Lister’s call and fills an important gap in the citizenship literature by explaining how Sikh women experience citizenship’s inclusionary/exclusionary dynamics.
In the following section, I draw from critical scholarship on citizenship to develop an understanding of citizenship as “situated citizenship” (Lister 1997b; Yuval-Davis 1997; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999; Glenn 2000, 2002; Lister et al. 2007). In the following two sections, I discuss the interview methodology and the findings, with attention to the ways respondents construct the category of woman in relation to home and marriage, and to the three primary ways respondents naturalize a gendered construction of citizenship – women’s rights and duties, public policies, and women’s religiosity. I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings for the study of democracy, citizenship, and gender.

Theoretical framework
To understand how women’s integration into formal institutional democracy and their exclusion from public space can coexist, I draw from critical scholarship on citizenship, particularly with respect to understanding citizenship as a lived experience that cannot be divorced from its context. Critical citizenship scholarship challenges the assumption that once suffrage was achieved for women, blacks, and other minorities, all citizens automatically became equal subjects (Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999, 4). A central question in this literature is whether citizenship is experienced differently depending on difference – age, class, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, and (dis)ability. By drawing on this literature, I examine Sikh women’s situated citizenship to demonstrate how gender intersects with other categories of difference to construct their citizenship as different and thus determining their capacity to exercise agency. Furthermore, by deconstructing the gendered nature of citizenship, this article reveals the chasm between the abstract promise of equal citizenship and the lived experience of situated citizenship; and shifts “the focus from women’s presence in and exclusion from different institutions to understanding gendered structures of those institutions and how to transform them” (Waylen et al. 2013, 14).

Feminist and critical citizenship theory
Feminist and critical scholarship on citizenship often uses T.H. Marshall’s approach as a key reference for contemporary analysis of citizenship. Marshall defines citizenship as full membership in a community in terms of three sets of rights – civil, political, and social rights (1950, 1964). Many scholars follow the Marshallian conception of citizenship because it has a double focus: it is both a normative vision about equality and an analytic tool for analyzing inequality. Another advantage of Marshall’s definition is that it links citizenship to membership in a community rather than the state, which enables an analysis of citizenship as legal status and social relation.12

Scholars also expand the Marshallian conception by focusing on what Marshall overlooked. Scholars criticize Marshall’s framework for its Euro-centric and male bias. In response to these biases, some scholars shift focus to the rights of cultural and religious minorities (Kymlicka 1995; Tully 1995; Parekh 2000). Others explore the exclusion of racialized groups from the full enjoyment of rights (Roediger 1991; Forbath 1999; Mills 1999; Lopez 2006). Still others examine the exclusion of women focusing on the gendered nature of citizenship (Okin 1979; Pateman 1988, 1989; Smith 1989; Lister 1997a, 1997b; Siim 2000). These scholars ask, do existing power relations allow citizenship to become a reality in practice (Hall and Held 1990; Held 1991)?

Feminists and critical citizenship scholars demonstrate how citizenship has failed its promise of equality (Lister et al. 2007, 10). These scholars criticize a universal model of citizenship and develop alternative theories of citizenship that encompass difference (Lister 2007, 52). What is common to all these approaches is that they do not ignore the differences among citizens; rather they suggest how these differences can be recognized and responded to, thus avoiding
assimilation or exclusion from the political community (Yuval-Davis 2006b, 207). For example, one strand of feminist scholarship reconceptualizes citizenship by adding new dimensions, such as sexual citizenship (Evans 1993; Richardson 1998, 2000; Weeks 1998; Bell and Binnie 2000; Cossman 2007) and intimate citizenship (Plummer 1995, 2001, 2003; Smyth 2008; Olesky 2009).

I draw from another feminist approach, which focuses on situated citizenship (Lister 1997b; Yuval-Davis 1997; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999; Glenn 2000, 2002; Lister et al. 2007). Situated citizenship refers to “the meaning that citizenship actually has in peoples’ lives and the ways in which people’s social and cultural backgrounds and material circumstances affect their lives as citizens” (Hall and Williamson 1999, 2). This concept captures how individuals understand and negotiate the three key elements of citizenship: rights and duties, belonging, and participation (Lister et al. 2007, 168). One of the benefits of this particular model of citizenship is that it insists on an intersectional approach. According to Siim, this is a promising research strategy because situated citizenship addresses “intersections between multiple inequality creating categories, where relationships between the categories is perceived not as universal but as situated and dependent on time and space” (2013, 767).

I follow these critical scholars by asking: Are Sikh women full members of their communities? Do Sikh women have the capacity – the political, civil, and social resources – to effectively exercise their citizenship rights? I argue that Sikh women experience democracy differentially; Sikh women do not have the actual power to be active as citizens, to enjoy a bundle of rights, and to command democratic participation because of the gendering of citizenship.

By defining citizenship as membership and participation in one’s community, I adopt a more expanded definition of the political; a definition that emphasizes “the importance of studying actors, processes, and experiences outside of the state as critical areas of politics” (Weldon 2013, 86). An expanded notion of politics can be traced to multiple sources. One source is feminist literature, which rejects homogeneous notions of “the citizen,” “the community,” and “women” and argues for a reformulation of these categories based on notions of difference and differential access to power (Collins 1986, 1989, 1990; Brah 1993; Lister 1997a; Yuval-Davis 1997, 2006a; Mohanty 2003; Beckwith 2005; Alcoff 2006). Power, for feminists, “cannot be understood as solely contained within the public domain just as rights cannot be limited to the individual-state relation” (Crowley et al. 1997, 1). An expanded definition of politics enables an analysis of power as “dispersed in social relations of all kinds, not just those conventionally thought of as political” (Glenn 2002, 16). According to Weldon, a focus on disadvantaged groups expands our definition of political action to include activities that political science would not have recognized as political in the past (2013, 86).

I investigate situated citizenship because this approach (1) measures the health of a democracy as much in its patterns of association in civil society as in the formal character of its institutions; (2) makes gender central to our analysis, while being sensitive to the intersection between gender and other identity categories without essentializing the meaning of any one category; and (3) expands our focus beyond institutional indicators, which makes visible the gendering of citizenship.

**Gender and citizenship in the Indian context**

An analysis of Indian citizenship needs to be attuned to the fact, that unlike women, and indigenous and minority populations in the West, whose respective feminist and multicultural struggles aimed at winning constitutional parity and minority claims for recognition after modern constitutions had been drafted, Indian women and minority groups won constitutional parity – including enfranchisement and cultural group recognition – prior to ratification of the Indian Constitution. The Indian Constitution protects gender equality, while also retaining a plural system of
personal law, a legacy of British colonial administration. Four religious communities – majority Hindu and minority Muslim, Christian, and Parsi – have their own personal laws. Other religious groups, Sikh, Buddhist, and Jain, are subsumed under Hindu personal law. No one may opt out of a religious identity, and therefore no one is exempt from personal law. Proponents of personal law claim that it secures religious difference. In India, the concern with equality and diversity was simultaneous and what emerges is a constitution that provides cultural autonomy for communities, but limits women’s rights.

Personal law associated with India’s religious communities shapes every aspect of a woman’s life – “it determines her status at birth; her capacity to own, inherit, and manage property; her freedom to work, marry, divorce, and remarry; and her relationship with her children” (Htun and Weldon 2011, 145). Personal law, according to Sen, “defines the relationship between women and men within the family … it concerns women intimately and yet it treats women as subordinate to and dependent on male kind” (2002, 486). Personal law effectively suspends Indian women’s most basic rights on behalf of group rights. The issue of personal law divides women on multiple fronts – between their respective religious communities, between civil rights and minority rights, and between gender equality and minority claims for recognition.

In addition to discriminatory personal law, Indian women are governed by civil law that privileges men. According to Kapur, Indian women are essentialized as: “caretakers, mothers and wives in need of protection” (2007, 133). Such assumptions result in laws that curtail rather than advance women’s rights. For example, in India, public policies on domestic violence tend to be concerned with the protection of patriarchal institutions. According to Kapur, the proposed reforms to domestic violence policies “sanctioned the right of men to beat their wives with reasonable cause, which included instances where a wife made a grab for her husband’s property” (2007, 133). These laws maintain gender inequality because they govern in a manner that privileges men.

I examine gender in the Sikh community because this case provides insight on the complex relationship between gender equality and minority rights in India. The Sikh community is a minority religious community, representing 2% of the Indian population, rooted in Punjab, with members throughout the world. Sikhism is the fifth largest organized religion, with approximately 30 million Sikhs. The Sikh community is a compelling case because religious prescriptions coincide with formal institutional democracy calling for women’s equality. Sikhism grants full equality to women in all spheres – religious, political, domestic, and economic. Sikhism espouses a radical equality by placing the Untouchable on par with the Brahman and woman on par with man. Given formal democratic institutions and religious mandates, one would expect Sikh women to enjoy equality. However, this is not the case. Even when religious and political institutions mandate gender equality, we find a contradictory situation of exclusionary inclusion among Sikhs. This contradictory experience provides further evidence for my claim that analyses of citizenship require specificity. A contextual approach helps to understand the gap between institutional and religious commitments to gender equality and the processes that result in gender exclusion.

Methodology

The data presented here are drawn from a larger project on the intersections between caste, nation, and gender (Behl 2009, 2010, 2012). My fieldwork research took place during Spring 2009 in two districts of Punjab – Mohali and Amritsar. I conducted 40 semi-structured, in-depth interviews based on a snowball sample. I selected interview respondents through “chain referral”: (1) I relied on my informants to make initial contact with respondents and (2) respondents whom I interviewed suggested others in their networks. Through this sampling method, I interviewed Sikhs of varying socioeconomic backgrounds, degrees of religious observance, and political
affiliation. It should be noted that my small-\(N\), nonrandom sample is not intended to be representative. These interviews may nonetheless illustrate the gendering of citizenship.

My positionality as a Sikh woman undoubtedly shaped the interview data.\(^22\) My prior knowledge, Punjabi language mastery, race/ethnicity, religion, and familial contacts enabled me to gain access in a way that other researchers may not. For example, I had multi-year relationships with my informants previous to my academic field experience. I lived with my informants and relied on their networks and reputation in local communities. However, I simultaneously encountered disadvantages because of my personal background. My positionality generated and blocked access to research situations. As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow argue, none of these demographic factors “is an automatic, universal key to open all doors: each one can play either or both ways, sometimes opening doors, sometimes shutting them” (2012, 67).

The interviews lasted from 30 to 120 minutes and were conducted in Punjabi. I asked respondents general questions about gender.\(^23\) I also asked respondents about their expectations and opinions on religion and gender, women’s role inside and outside the home, personal law, dowry deaths, and sex ratio. I used broad, open-ended questions to allow respondents to define equality, woman, and discrimination on their own terms. By doing so, I gathered data on gender roles, and the degree to which individuals approved of these gender roles. I transcribed each interview, and then developed a coding scheme\(^24\) to interpret respondents’ answers.\(^25\)

In total, I interviewed 21 men and 19 women. The oldest respondent was 71, and the youngest was 21. Respondents varied in educational levels: 7 were uneducated/illiterate, 11 completed some primary education (K-9th classes), 10 completed some secondary education (10th-12th classes), and 12 completed some higher education (beyond 12th class). Respondents also varied based on religiosity: 12 identified as amritdhari, 22 identified as kesdhari, and 6 identified as sehajdhari (most traditionally religious to least traditionally religious).\(^26\) Respondents varied based on political affiliation as well: 10 identified with Indian National Congress, 15 identified with Shiromani Akali Dal, 9 identified as independent, and 6 declined to state. Participants also varied based on caste:\(^27\) Nine were identified as Khatri, 14 as Jat, and 17 as Scheduled/backward caste. In this article, I use the category of general caste to refer to Jats and Khatis, and use the category of Scheduled Caste (SC) to refer to former untouchables or dalits identified by the Indian state as deserving special benefits to ameliorate casteism. To ensure respondents’ confidentiality, I use pseudonyms throughout the article.

**Interview data**

Through an analysis of semi-structured, in-depth interview data, I examine the gendered nature of Sikh citizenship to reveal the chasm between the abstract promise of equal citizenship and the lived experience of situated citizenship. In particular, I deconstruct respondents’ operative meanings of “woman” to illustrate that respondents construct and understand the category in relation to home and marriage. I also find that respondents naturalize gendered citizenship by focusing on women’s rights and duties, public policies, and women’s religiosity. These themes are dominant among male and female respondents, and I rely on one example of each theme to illustrate a general trend in the responses. Lastly, I analyze the interview data with attention to how respondents understand and negotiate key elements of citizenship: rights and duties, belonging, and participation.

**Women’s rights and duties**

Most respondents understand women as partial members of their communities with limited rights and duties. Respondents’ expectations about appropriate gender roles limit women’s participation
to the private space of the home, as nonworkers, defined in relation to men and marriage. When I asked women about their participation in civic and associational life, their responses, unlike men’s responses, were centered on the home. Female respondents understood their engagement in civil society in terms of distance from their home, which limited their participation and belonging to their own neighborhood. For example, female respondents often stated that the local gurdwara (Sikh temple) was too far from their home and that they feared walking to the gurdwara. Men’s discussion of associational life did not include geographical restriction, concern about transportation, or fear about safety. Fear about safety significantly undermines women’s ability to move freely, to use public spaces, and to participate in associational life, the labor market, and educational life.

Democratization scholars point to Fundamental Rights as evidence that Indian women are full citizens, but they do not ask how individuals interpret, enforce, and experience these rights. In the abstract, Sikh women enjoy freedom of speech, association, and travel; however, interview responses illustrate that lack of safety, both experienced and perceived, determine whether Sikh women can exercise their rights. A feminist analysis of citizenship illuminates dimensions of Sikh women’s lives that traditional democratic scholars overlook and points to the failed promise of equality.

Respondents like Surinder Singh, a 22-year-old general-caste man, define women’s rights and duties in relation to home and marriage:

Ladies’ … devotion is to give children life. This is their greatest devotion – that they raise their children. Their biggest seva [service] is to their children; mothers are everything for their children.

By emphasizing women’s seva as mothers, Singh obscures questions of Sikh women’s participation and belonging outside the home. Questions about women’s equality outside of the home are never asked because women’s greatest seva is equated with the home, marriage, and motherhood. To say that women are mothers at the center of the household also ignores working class, often lower caste, women who work outside the home and neglects women without children. According to Mohanty, “the opposition between definitions of the ‘laborer’ and of the ‘housewife’ anchors the invisibility (and caste-related status) of work; in effect, it defines women as nonworkers” (2003, 150). By definition, housewives cannot be workers; rather, housewives make male labor outside the home possible. The work of wives and mothers is not seen as real work.

By deconstructing Singh’s operative meaning of woman, we find that he defines the category in relation to home and marriage, which justifies discrimination against women, and demarcates the home as the natural space of Sikh women beyond the reach of social, economic, and political intervention. Interview responses, like Singh’s, reveal the mechanisms that construct and maintain gendered citizenship; mechanisms that conventional institutional indicators of democracy render invisible.

Public policies

Some respondents understand women’s rights as limited, especially in inheritance and property. Udham Singh, a 33-year-old SC man, claims:

The state is now saying that girls have a legal right to a share of their parents’ land … The law itself is wrong. The main hand in female feticide is the states because the state made this law … Let’s say there is a falling-out between the sister and her brothers. Well, then she sells her parental property and destroys her brothers. And she becomes the owner of her parents’ land and of her in-laws’ land; she is the owner of the old property and the new property … The state causes the killing that is
occurring of young girls … the state is responsible for these killings. If this law were to change then this [killing] would stop.

Respondents, like Singh, blame the very public policies designed to protect women because these policies can potentially transform women’s economic position vis-a-vis inheritance, marriage, and dowry. We normally think of inheritance and property rights as determined by constitutions and statutes, but an analysis of the interview data reveals that private citizens gender property rights through interpretation and enforcement at the local level. Localized practices – violence against women, female feticide, and dowry murders – determine whether Sikh women have substantive as opposed to purely formal rights. Democratization scholars often point to the existence of certain laws and statutes to argue that Indian women are full citizens; however, they do not ask how individuals interpret, enforce, and experience these laws. What remains unexamined is the extent to which legislative and legal approaches effectively achieve gender equality and engender behavioral and attitudinal changes.

In Singh’s interview response, the category of woman is multiple, yet constrained. Singh acknowledges women’s multiple roles as daughter, wife, and daughter-in-law. However, in doing so, he defines women in relation to men and marriage. Singh’s response also privileges middle-class women over working-class women because dowry murders and inheritance disputes are predominantly a middle-class phenomenon (Narayan 1997, 92). In Singh’s response, the simultaneous operation of sexism, casteism, and classism obscures the experience of working class, lower-caste women, justifies violence against all women, and genders property rights.

Singh’s interview response also speaks to gendered patterns of land ownership in India. In legal terms, women enjoy extensive rights to inherit land, but in practice, most are disinherit ed. According to respondents, like Surjit Kaur, a 28-year-old general-caste woman, women’s rights “are written in the books but aren’t practiced”:

People don’t actually give their daughters land; however, legally daughters do have a right to their parents’ land … once again, the rights are all words … Practically speaking, girls don’t receive any land from their parents, and they don’t receive any land from their in-laws.

Women’s command over immovable assets is important for women’s economic and social well-being because it alleviates poverty, increases economic and social security, increases the likelihood of children surviving, attending school and receiving health care, reduces destitution following widowhood, and reduces spousal desertion. Datta finds that property rights “increase women’s participation in decision making, access to knowledge and information about public matters, sense of security, self-esteem, and the respect that they receive from their spouses” (2006, 293). Women’s property rights guarantee social citizenship, which, in turn, enables women to actualize their political and civil rights.

Some respondents, like Udham Singh, characterize the protection of women’s property rights as a threat to men. However, according to Surjit Kaur, women are victims who are routinely disinherited. Democratization scholars point to laws as evidence for women’s full citizenship without recognizing that these laws are themselves gendered. An analysis of situated citizenship challenges these conclusions by pointing out processes of gendering that traditional democratic indicators overlook.

Women’s religiosity

Many respondents, like Beena Kaur, a 65-year-old general-caste woman, conceive of women’s rights and duties, belonging, and participation as contingent upon their religiosity.
Nowadays, forget a woman wearing her dupata [scarf] on her head … The dupata has flown away. Sleeveless arms, very, very small blouses … The meaning of this is that today’s woman has become shameless. She is showing off her body, like many Hindustani [Indian] women. And men are becoming hunters. The men are hungry. Guru Gobind Singh Maharaj said, “Read bani [the word of God] and wear bana [religious dress]” … a modest salwar-kameez [long-shirt and pants], and dupata on one’s head … If a girl is herself strong, if a girl dresses well … then no man has the nerve to even get close to this girl. A woman is respected in our religion … However, if we ourselves have turned on our proper attire, then how is that the Guru’s fault?

Kaur’s focus on women’s religiosity allows her to shift all culpability for violence against women to women themselves by stating that women’s adherence to proper attire, which functions as a visible marker of women’s modesty, determines their access to the three key elements of citizenship. A modest woman, according to Kaur, wears salwar kameez and a dupata on her head and any deviation from this bana is equated with a shameful woman who deserves mistreatment. In Kaur’s response, the category of religion and gender intersect to create divisions between Sikh women, characterized as modest (if they adhere to religious prescriptions), and Indian/Hindustani women, characterized as shameless. Kaur’s response points to the fact that the category of women is not homogenous, rather women negotiate between minority claims for recognition and gender equality. Also, Kaur’s response demonstrates that women are victims and agents of violence against women.

Kaur assumes that women are the objects of sexual desire and men the desiring subjects, an assumption that justifies the injunction that women should “hide their charms” when in public so as not to excite the sexual energies of men (Mahmood 2005, 110–111). Kaur frees men of any responsibility for “hunting” women, while legitimizing the most extreme form of exclusion—violence against women. Kaur’s response disadvantages women by assigning them the burden of maintaining the community’s purity through their dress, which in turn, limits women’s access to public spaces. A focus on women’s religiosity enables Kaur and others to justify, and perhaps mandate, violence against women by normalizing men’s role as sexual predator and women’s role as sexual object. Democratization scholars point to formal rights as evidence for Indian women’s equality. This analysis examines how respondents’ expectations about religious norms are in tension with these formal rights. An analysis of Sikh situated citizenship makes visible gendered religious norms that determine who can exercise their rights, and who is most vulnerable to violence.

Contributions and implications

Democratization scholars point to institutional indicators to argue that Indian democracy is consolidated and Indian women are full citizens. I argue that institutional indicators tell a very limited story – and hide more than they show because they overlook the intersection between gender and multiple inequality creating categories, which determine women’s agency. In contrast, my analysis of situated citizenship makes us attune to Sikh women’s experience of exclusionary inclusion by showing how the category of woman is constructed in relation to home and marriage, and how gendered citizenship is naturalized. My account of Sikh women’s situated citizenship is not generalizable; rather it is illustrative of contradictory processes of democratic participation, and inclusionary/exclusionary dynamics of citizenship. By interrogating processes of gendering, this article investigates dimensions of social, cultural, and political life that go undetected in mainstream democratization discussions. Beyond making women and gender visible, my approach to citizenship also furthers feminist and democratic goals. An analysis of situated citizenship reveals the gap between the abstract promise of equal citizenship and the lived experience of citizenship; shifts the focus from women’s presence in and exclusion from institutions to
understanding gendered structures of those institutions; and helps to combat women’s differential experience of democracy in any patriarchy.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Bhai Gurdas Fellowship, Center for Sikh and Punjab Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara for facilitating this research. I would also like to thank Raymond Rocco, Raquel Zamora, Jennet Kirkpatrick, and the three anonymous referees for their constructive and thoughtful comments.

Notes
1. Objective measures characterize India as a free, fully institutionalized democracy. Polity IV characterizes India as democratic with a score in +6 to +9 range (−10 being most autocratic and +10 being most democratic). Freedom House characterizes India as free with a political rights score of 2 and a civil liberties score of 3 (1 being the most free and 7 the least free).

2. It is difficult to obtain reliable statistics for violence against women in India because rape within marriage is not counted as a crime, penile penetration is a necessary element of rape in Indian law, and women are deterred from reporting crimes. Often a woman’s sexual history is used against her, medical evidence is not taken promptly, police delay in processing complaints, and sometimes police sexually assault women who report crimes.

3. In comparison, 55% of women in Kigali, Rwanda and 25% of women in Paris, France feel unsafe in public spaces (UN Women, Safe Cities Global Initiative).

4. The survey also found that respondents perceive sexual harassment as the biggest risk for women’s safety and identify roads (50%), public transportation (39%), and markets (22%) as most unsafe public spaces (United Nations Women2012, Survey, Safer Cities Free of Violence Against Women and Girls Initiative).

5. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes, the rape rate in India is 1.7. The mean rape rate is 11.7 and the median rape rate is 5.2. The five highest rape rates: South Africa (113.5), Australia (91.6), Swaziland (76.1), Canada (68.2), and Jamaica (50.8). The five lowest rape rates: Pakistan (0), Egypt (0.2), Armenia (0.3), Maldives (0.3), and Azerbaijan (0.4). The lower rape rates in India can be attributed to underreporting, lack of reliable data, and differences in the definition of rape. The UN rape rate is calculated per 100,000 population (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010, International Statistics on Crime and Justice).

6. Raymond Rocco and I collaboratively developed the concept of exclusionary inclusion, but we deploy the concept in different contexts. Rocco examines the forms of political, cultural, and economic exclusions of Latinos [in the United States] and argue[s] that these constitute a pattern of exclusionary inclusion, a type of belonging that regulates and restricts the degree and nature of participation in the primary institutions of society. (2014, 6)

I make sense of Sikh women’s experience of citizenship and argue that their experience constitutes a pattern of exclusionary inclusion, where women are included in formal democratic institutions, but always on a limited basis because their inclusion is determined by the intersection between gender and other categories of difference.

7. According to the 2012 UN Women Delhi survey, when respondents were asked what factors put women at risk for violence in public spaces, the number one response was gender. Gender, more so than age, religion, disability, and state/region, puts women at risk (United Nations Women 2012, Delhi Survey: Safer Cities Free of Violence Against Women and Girls Initiative).

8. Similarly, Chhibber finds, “women’s [political] participation … depends upon their role in the household” (2003, 421).

9. My intention is to question democratization literature by demonstrating that within a model of developmental democratic stages India is not yet a model democracy. In future research, I plan to make visible the often unexamined assumption about the superiority of liberal democracy that underlies
the democratization literature; an assumption that leads to the conclusion that all nations must follow the singular path chosen by the West.


11. I draw from Walzer’s neo-Tocquevillian argument, which finds that the strength of liberal democracy depends on a vibrant civil society (1991, 302). According to Chambers and Kymlicka, many scholars use a neo-Tocquevillian perspective “to analyze the strength of liberal democracy in the West, as well as the processes of democratization around the world” (2002, 2).

12. According to Yuval-Davis, “studying citizenship can throw light on … the complex relationships between individuals, collectivities and the state” (1997, 6). Similarly, Lister argues, citizenship is “not simply a set of legal rules governing the relationship between individuals and the state … but also a set of social relationships between … individual citizens” (1997a, 29). Rocco argues, “citizenship is not solely … a legal status, but rather a political mechanism for the control and containment of access to institutions of power and of the distribution of rights” (2004, 16).

13. See, for example, the New Left scholarship (Hobsbawm 1980; Scott 1985, 1989, 1990), Subaltern Studies (Guha and Spivak 1988), race and ethnic studies (Kelley 1994; Hanchard 2006).

14. Weldon discusses a range of activities: “violence against women; religious practices … reproductive rights; language; crime; non-state violence; ethnic conflict; communalism; family structure; national identities … [and] social citizenship” (2013, 85).

15. This critique originated with women of color who were marginalized as women in the anti-racists movements and as racialized minorities in the feminist movement. Women of color argued that their experience differed from those of white women and men of color because they experienced multiple subordinations. They challenged the use of women as homogenous categories reflecting the common essence of all women. This intervention decentered white, western, heterosexual, middle-class woman, and pluralized feminism (Combahee River Collective [1977] 1997; Anzaldúa and Moraga 1981; hooks 1981, 1994; Feminist Review 1984; Collins 1986, 1989, 1990, Anzaldúa 1987; King 1988; Crenshaw 1989, 1991; Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Mohanty 2003; Brah and Phoenix 2004; Yuval-Davis 2006a; Barvosa 2008).

16. India is a constitutional parliamentary democracy, with written Fundamental Rights containing extensive equality provisions: Article 14 guarantees equality; Article 15 restricts the state from sex-based discrimination; Article 16 guarantees equal opportunity; Article 39.d guarantees equal pay for equal work; and Article 19 guarantees freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of travel, freedom of residence, and freedom to form labor unions. For further details, see Kapur and Cossman (1999), Nussbaum (2001, 2002) and Trivedi (2003).


18. Sikhism does not segregate based on religion, caste, race, class, or gender (Singh 2000, 67). In Sikhism, all religious activity is open to women, whereas in Hinduism and Islam, a woman may not read the scriptures, lead the prayers, particularly if she is menstruating (Singh 1998, 131). Gender equality has been institutionalized in Sikhism through the Rahit Maryada (Code of Conduct), which lays out specific rules to combat female oppression: female veiling, female infanticide, and dowry are forbidden, and widow remarriage is sanctioned (Mann 2001).

19. Socio-economic measures indicate gender-based discrimination in Punjab: a highly skewed sex ratio (895:1000), an extremely low female workforce participation rate, high rates of female feticide, high rates of neglect of female child, high rates of domestic violence, high rates of dowry deaths, and restricted property and inheritance rights (Gupta 1987; Chhachhi 1989; Booth and Verma 1992; Sen 1992, 2003; Mutharayappa et al. (1997); Grewal 2008). Similarly, social norms, such as lack of female granthis (priests), restrictions on women’s religious seva (service), and women’s restricted relationship with her natal family also indicate sexism (Singh 1993, 2000, 2008, 2009; Jakobsh 2000, 2003, 2006; Shanker 2002).

20. Snowball sampling is used in two situations: research on hard-to-reach populations and research requiring trust. Snowball sampling is useful because it provides access to previously hidden or stigmatized populations; creates trust between researcher and researched; and provides an economical and effective way of sampling (Atkinson and Flint 2001). Snowball sampling is limited because the sample is not a representative, random sample, and therefore one cannot make claims of generalizability; the sampling method requires prior knowledge of insiders to initiate the chain referral; and the method depends on respondents to participate in the chain referral (Atkinson and Flint 2001).

21. I knew my informants through familial relations prior to my fieldwork experience. The informant from Mohali district was active with the Akali Dal party and the informant from Amritsar district was active...
in the Congress party. Both informants used their political, personal, occupational, and religious networks to introduce me to respondents.

22. The impact of my positionality on data collection cannot be fully addressed in this article. My future research responds to these concerns by relying on feminist methodologies to problematize the neutrality of the researcher and to demonstrate that knowledge production itself is thoroughly political.

23. For example, I asked respondents to describe themselves, describe their identity, and explain how others describe them.

24. The following themes were most salient in the respondents’ discussion of gender: (1) women’s rights and duties, (2) public policies, (3) women’s religiosity, (4) women’s purity, and (5) women as perpetual outsiders. I used these categories to interpret the interview responses. I limit my analysis to three salient themes to meet journal standards for word count.

25. I use the language of interpretation to draw attention to the fact that as a researcher I did not simply observe patterns in the data. The language of interpretation problematizes conventional positivists assumptions about data collection and shifts evaluative standards from questions about validity, reliability, replicability, rigor, and objectivity to question about trustworthiness, systemacity, reflexivity, transparency, and positionality (Sprague 2005; Hawkesworth 2006; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012).

26. The first segment is amritdhari, those who keep unshorn hair and have undergone the baptismal ceremony. The second is kesdhari, those who keep hair but have not been baptized. The third category refers to sahijdhari, those who do not keep unshorn hair and have not undergone the baptismal ceremony (Mann 2004, 99).

27. In Sikhism, no scriptural sanction exists for caste distinction, as in Hinduism, but nonetheless a caste hierarchy exists (McLeod 1975; Dhami 1995; Mann 2001; Puri 2003).

28. Women progress over their lifetime from a daughter in her father’s home to a wife and mother in her husband’s home to a mother-in-law in her son’s home. For a detailed discussion, see Nussbaum (2000), Mohanty (2003), Sangtín Writers and Nagar (2006), Mines and Lamb (2010).

29. According to Singh, daughters are characterized as beautiful commodities that will be lost to someone else, whereas sons are characterized as a source of family wealth because with a son comes “his wife and her dowry adding to the economic resources of his family” (2009, 122).

30. Many female respondents preferred to engage in associational life within half mile to mile radius from their home because they feared walking beyond this distance. Also, many women feared crossing major roads within this radius.

31. Data on Indian women’s educational attainment and labor market participation support this claim: 65% of women are literate compared to 82% of men; 26% of women complete secondary education compared to 50% of men; and 33% of women participate in the labor market compared to 81% of men (United Nations Asia-Pacific Human Development Report 2010).

32. Similarly, Grewal finds that in Punjab “the idea of women being involved in matters outside the home continues to be … discouraged. A woman’s work is within the chaardivari, literally ‘the four walls’ of her home” (2008, 169).


34. Sikh women are differentiated based on their caste, sect, and class background. For detailed discussion, see Brah (2005).

References


